The factual situations catalogued in the first seven subsections are appropriate and constitutionally acceptable grounds upon which to exercise personal jurisdiction over an individual. Subsection (7) is bracketed because not all states maintain putative father registries.

Finally, Subsection (8) tracks the broad, catch-all provisions found in many state statutes, including California, Civ. P. Code Section 410.10 (1973); New York, supra; and Texas, supra. Note, however, that the California provision, standing alone, was found to be inadequate to sustain a child support order under the facts presented in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).

When read together, the 2001 amendments to Subsection(a) deleting the term "modify" and the addition of new Subsection (b) are designed to preclude a tribunal of the forum from ignoring the restrictions on modification of child-support orders established by UIFSA. Some courts broadly construed the former reference to "modify" to justify ignoring the requirement of Section 611 that, absent agreement of the parties, a petitioner for modification of a child-support order of an issuing State when all parties have left that State must be a nonresident of the forum. The 2001 amendments make clear that a tribunal may not apply the long-arm provisions of Subsection (a), or any other law of the forum, and thereby assert that personal jurisdiction over both individual parties to a support order of another State is sufficient to modify that order. The limitations on the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction provided by Sections 611 and 615 must be observed irrespective of the existence of personal jurisdiction over the parties. Long-arm personal jurisdiction over the respondent, standing alone, is not sufficient to grant subject matter jurisdiction over a proposed modification to a tribunal of the State of residence of the petitioner, see LeTellier v. LeTellier, 40 S.W.3d 490, 90 A.L.R.5th 707 (Tenn. 2001), reversing 1999 WL 732487 (Tenn. App. 1999).

Subsection (b) is intended to cement the principle that modification of an existing order is not subject solely to the usual rules of personal jurisdiction over both parties. Even if a