This section can be said to state a legal truism, albeit a |
useful one. That is, once a tribunal issues a support order |
binding on the parties, which must be based on personal |
jurisdiction by virtue of Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 |
(1978) and Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957), |
jurisdiction in personam continues absent the statutorily |
specified reasons for its termination. The rule established by |
UIFSA is that the personal jurisdiction necessary to sustain |
enforcement or modification of an order of child support or |
spousal support persists as long as the order is in force and |
effect, even as to arrears, see Sections 205-207, 211, infra. |
This is true irrespective of the context in which the support |
order arose, e.g., divorce, UIFSA support establishment, |
parentage establishment, modification of prior controlling |
order, etc. Insofar as a child-support order is concerned, |
depending on specific factual circumstances a distinction is |
made between continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify an |
order and continuing jurisdiction to enforce an order, see |
Sections 205 and 206, infra. Authority to modify a spousal |
support order is permanently reserved to the issuing tribunal, |
Section 211, infra. |