| This section can be said to state a legal truism, albeit a |
| useful one. That is, once a tribunal issues a support order |
| binding on the parties, which must be based on personal |
| jurisdiction by virtue of Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 |
| (1978) and Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957), |
| jurisdiction in personam continues absent the statutorily |
| specified reasons for its termination. The rule established by |
| UIFSA is that the personal jurisdiction necessary to sustain |
| enforcement or modification of an order of child support or |
| spousal support persists as long as the order is in force and |
| effect, even as to arrears, see Sections 205-207, 211, infra. |
| This is true irrespective of the context in which the support |
| order arose, e.g., divorce, UIFSA support establishment, |
| parentage establishment, modification of prior controlling |
| order, etc. Insofar as a child-support order is concerned, |
| depending on specific factual circumstances a distinction is |
| made between continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify an |
| order and continuing jurisdiction to enforce an order, see |
| Sections 205 and 206, infra. Authority to modify a spousal |
| support order is permanently reserved to the issuing tribunal, |
| Section 211, infra. |