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tribunal of the child's current home State. If that State has | | not issued a support order, Subsection (b)(2) looks next to the | | order most recently issued. Finally, Subsection (b)(3) provides | | that if none of the existing multiple orders are entitled to be | | denominated as the controlling order because none of the | | preceding priorities apply, the forum tribunal is directed to | | issue a new order, given that it has personal jurisdiction over | | the obligor and obligee. The new order becomes the controlling | | order, establishes the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the | | tribunal, and fixes the support obligation and its nonmodifiable | | aspects, primarily duration of support, see Sections 604 and | | 611(c), infra. The rationale for creating a new order to replace | | existing multiple orders is that there is no valid reason to | | prefer the terms of any one of the multiple orders over another | | in the absence of a fact situation described in Subsections | | (b)(1) or (b)(2). |
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| | | As originally promulgated, UIFSA did not come to grips with | | whether existing multiple orders issued by different States | | might be entitled to full faith and credit without regard to | | the determination of the controlling order under the Act. The | | drafters took the position that state law, however uniform, | | could not interfere with the ultimate interpretation of a | | constitutional directive. Fortunately, this question has | | almost certainly been mooted by the 1996 amendment to 28 | | U.S.C. Section 1738B, Full Faith and Credit for Child Support | | Orders. Congress incorporated the multiple order recognition | | provisions of Section 207 of UIFSA into FFCCSOA virtually word | | for word in the PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY | | RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1996. Pub. L. 104-193, Aug. 22, 1996, | | 110 Stat. 2221. |
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| | | It is not altogether clear whether the terms of UIFSA apply to | | a strictly intrastate case; that is, a situation in which | | multiple child support orders have been issued by multiple | | tribunals of a single State and all parties and the child | | continue to reside in that State. This is not an uncommon | | situation, often traceable to the intrastate applicability of | | RURESA. A literal reading of the statutory language suggests | | the section applies. Further, FFCCSOA does not make a | | distinction regarding the tribunals that issued multiple | | orders. If multiple orders have been issued by different | | tribunals in the home State of the child, most likely the most | | recent will be recognized as the controlling order, | | notwithstanding the fact that UIFSA Section 207(b)(2)(B) and | | FFCCSOA 42 U.S.C. Section 1738B(f)(3) literally do not apply. | | At the very least, this section, together with FFCCSOA, | | provide a template for resolving such conflicts. |
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| | | Subsection (c), added in 1996, clarifies that any party or a | | support enforcement agency may request a tribunal of the forum | | State to identify the controlling order. That party is | | directed |
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