| This section identifies situations in which local law is |
| inapplicable. A basic principle of UIFSA is that throughout |
| the process the controlling order remains the order of the |
| issuing State, and that responding States only assist in the |
| enforcement of that order. Absent a loss of continuing, |
| exclusive jurisdiction and a subsequent modification of the |
| order, the order never becomes an "order of the responding |
| State." Ultimate responsibility for enforcement and final |
| resolution of the obligor's compliance with all aspects of the |
| support order belongs to the issuing State. Thus, calculation |
| of whether the obligor has fully complied with the payment of |
| current support, arrears, and interest on arrears is the duty |
| of the issuing State. For example, under Subsection (a) the |
| responding State must recognize and enforce an order of the |
| issuing State for the support of a child until age 21, |
| notwithstanding the fact that the duty of support of a child |
| ends at age 18 under the law of the responding State, see |
| Robdau v. Commonwealth, Virginia Dept. Social Serv., 543 |
| S.E.2d 602 (Va. App. 2001); State ex rel. Harnes v. Lawrence, |
| 538 S.E.2d 223 (N.C. App. 2000). Similarly, the law of the |
| issuing State governs whether a payment made for the benefit |
| of a child, such as a Social Security benefit for a child of a |
| disabled obligor, should be credited against the obligor's |
| child support obligation. The amendments of 2001 to Subsection |
| (a) are intended to clarify the range of subjects that are |
| governed by the choice of law rules established in this |
| section. |