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Thomas v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 857 P.2d 532, 534 (Colo. Ct. | | App. 1993); Executive Life Ins. Co. v. John Hammer & Assoc., | | Inc., 569 So. 2d 855, 857 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1990); Amalgamated | | Transit Union Local 900 v. Suburban Bus Div., 262 Ill. App. 3d | | 334, 199 Ill. Dec. 630, 635, 634 N.E.2d 469, 474(1994); Des | | Moines Asphalt & Paving Co. v. Colcon Industries Corp., 500 | | N.W.2d 70, 72 (Iowa 1993); City of Lenexa v. C.L. Fairley Const. | | Co., 15 Kan.App. 2d 207, 805 P.2d 507, 510 (1991); The Beyt, | | Rish, Robbins Group v. Appalachian Reg. Healthcare, Inc., 854 | | S.W.2d 784, 786 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993); City of Dearborn v. | | Freeman-Darling, Inc., 119 Mich.App. 439, 326 N.W.2d 831 (1982); | | City of Morris v. Duininck Bros. Inc., 531 N.W.2d 208, 210 | | (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Gaines v. Fin. Planning Consultants, | | Inc., 857 S.W.2d 430, 433 (Mo.Ct.App. 1993); Exber v. Sletten, | | 92 Nev. 721, 558 P.2d 517 (1976); State v. Stremick Const. Co., | | 370 N.W.2d 730, 735 (N.D. 1985); Messa v. State Farm Ins. Co., | | 433 Pa.Super. 594, 641 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1994); Smith v. H.E. | | Butt Grocery Co., 18 S.W.3d 910 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); Valero | | Energy Corp. v. Teco Pipeline Co., 2 S.W.3d 576 (Tex. Ct. App. | | 1999); City of Lubbock v. Hancock, 940 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Ct. App. | | 1996); but see Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 58 | | N.Y.2d 193, 647 N.E.2d 1308, 623 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1995) (stating | | that a court rather than an arbitrator under New York | | arbitration law should decide whether a statute of limitations | | time bars an arbitration). |
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| | | In particular it should be noted that Section 6(b), which | | provides for courts to decide substantive arbitrability, is | | subject to waiver under Section 4(a). This approach is not | | only the law in most States but also follows Supreme Court | | precedent under the FAA that if there is no agreement to the | | contrary, questions of substantive arbitrability are for the | | courts to decide. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, | | 514 U.S. 938 (1995). Some arbitration organizations, such as | | the American Arbitration Association in its rules on | | commercial arbitration disputes, provide that arbitrators, | | rather than courts, make the initial determination as to | | substantive arbitrability. AAA, Commercial Disp. Resolution | | Pro. R-8(b); see also Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d | | 469 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that when parties agreed that all | | disputes arising out of or in connection with distributorship | | agreement would be settled by binding arbitration in | | accordance with the rules of arbitration of the International | | Chamber of Commerce, they agreed to submit issues of | | arbitrability to arbitrator); Daiei v. United States Shoe | | Corp., 755 F. Supp. 299 (D. Haw. 1991) (noting that parties | | agreed to submit issues of arbitrability to arbitrator, when | | they incorporated by reference in their arbitration agreement | | the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce providing | | that "any decision as to the arbitrator's jurisdiction shall | | lie with the arbitrator"). |
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