|
review - because they do not entangle the courts in reviewing |
| the merits of challenged arbitration awards. Instead, appellate |
| arbitral review mechanisms merely add a second level to the |
| contractual arbitration procedure that permits parties |
| disappointed with the initial arbitral result to secure a degree |
| of protection from the occasional "wrong" arbitration decision. |
| See Stephen L. Hayford and Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration |
| in Evolution: An Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 Ohio St. |
| J. on Disp. Res. 405-06 (1995). This approach would not present |
| the FAA preemption, "creating jurisdiction," and line-drawing |
| problems identified with the expanded judicial review through an |
| opt-in provision. It is also consistent with the Supreme Court's |
| contractual view of commercial arbitration in that it preserves |
| the parties' agreement to resolve the merits of the controversy |
| between them through arbitration, without resort to the courts. |
| When parties agree that the decision of an arbitrator will be |
| "final and binding," it is implicit that it is the arbitrator's |
| interpretation of the contract and the law that they seek, and |
| not the legal opinion of a court. In addition, an internal, |
| arbitral appeal mechanism is more likely to keep arbitration |
| decisions out of the courts and maintain the overall goals of |
| speed, lower cost, and greater efficiency. |