| Similarly, public confidence in and the voluntary use of |
mediation can be expected to expand if people have confidence |
that the mediator will not take sides or disclose their |
statements, particularly in the context of other |
investigations or judicial processes. The public confidence |
rationale has been extended to permit the mediator to object |
to testifying, so that the mediator will not be viewed as |
biased in future mediation sessions that involve comparable |
parties. See, e.g., NLRB v. Macaluso, 618 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. |
1980) (public interest in maintaining the perceived and actual |
impartiality of mediators outweighs the benefits derivable |
from a given mediator's testimony). To maintain public |
confidence in the fairness of mediation, a number of States |
prohibit a mediator from disclosing mediation communications |
to a judge or other officials in a position to affect the |
decision in a case. Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, Section 712(c) |
(1998) (employment discrimination); Fla. Stat. Ann. Section |
760.34(1) (1997) (housing discrimination); Ga. Code Ann. |
Section 8-3-208(a) (1990) (housing discrimination); Neb. Rev. |
Stat. Section 20-140 (1973) (public accommodations); Neb. Rev. |
Stat. Section 48-1118 (1993) (employment discrimination); Cal. |
Evid. Code Section 703.5 (West 1994). This justification also |
is reflected in standards against the use of a threat of |
disclosure or recommendation to pressure the parties to accept |
a particular settlement. See, e.g., Center for Dispute |
Settlement, National Standards for Court-Connected Mediation |
Programs (1994); Society for Professionals in Dispute |
Resolution, Mandated Participation and Settlement Coercion: |
Dispute Resolution as it Relates to the Courts (1991); see |
also Craig A. McEwen & Laura Williams, Legal Policy and Access |
to Justice Through Courts and Mediation, 13 Ohio St. J. on |
Disp. Resol. 831, 874 (1998). |