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| In 1988 the Legislature doubled the maximum sentence of | imprisonment for all Class A crimes from 20 years to 40 years. In | 1991 the Law Court examined the legislative history of the relevant | act and determined that the legislative intent was to "make | available two discrete ranges of sentences for Class A crimes." | See State v. Lewis, 590 A.2d 149, 151 (Me. 1991). Most Class A | crime sentences were intended to remain in the original 0- to 20- | year range, while the "expanded range" of 20- to 40-year sentences | was reserved "only for the most heinous and violent crimes | committed against a person." The sentencing court was to apply | this "heinousness" standard "in its discretion" as a sentencing | factor, subject to appellate review. |
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| | This 2-tier system has been placed under a constitutional | cloud by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in | Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which held that | sentencing factors increasing punishment beyond the maximum | authorized must be treated as elements of crimes to be pleaded | and proved beyond a reasonable doubt rather than as sentencing | factors. Since the "heinousness" standard can be interpreted as | increasing maximum punishment of up to 20 years to the "expanded | range" of 20 to 40 years, it is potentially unconstitutional | absent legislative correction. |
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| | The bill eliminates the constitutional cloud by replacing the | 2-tier system with a single 0- to 30-year range. This change | anticipates that the Law Court, through the case-by-case sentence | review process, will develop and apply criteria that will avoid | the imposition of excessively harsh sentences within the single | range. In solving the Apprendi problem, this change will affect | few actual sentences. |
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| | The bill adds the culpable mental state of "intentionally" to | Title 29-A, section 105, subsection 4, regarding the enforcement | of the motor vehicle laws, to conform it to Title 17-A, sections | 15-A and 17. |
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