The bill addresses a defect in the statute prohibiting obstruction of government administration revealed by the recent case of State v. Matson, 2003 ME 34, 818 A.2d 213. In Matson, the defendant had been convicted under the statute for physically interfering with the arrest of another person. Because the physical interference, intentionally standing in the way and refusing to move, was held to constitute something less than "force, violence or intimidation," the conviction was reversed.

The focus of the crime is intentional physical interference with an official function, not "intimidation" of an officer. Harassing speech alone is not sufficient, but when it is accompanied by a physical act that actually interferes with an official function, the further requirement of "intimidation" is unnecessary.

The bill repeals Title 17-A, section 1158 and replaces it with section 1158-A, which differs in the following ways.

1. It makes technical drafting changes to clarify the law.

2. It clarifies that forfeiture of a firearm under certain circumstances is conditioned on the State's both alleging that the firearm was used by the defendant or an accomplice during the commission of the crime in the indictment or information and proving that allegation to the fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt.

3. It clarifies when a court may not order as part of the sentence the forfeiture of a firearm otherwise qualifying for forfeiture. Access to the exception is available only to a person other than the defendant. The exception must be established by the other person at a point in time prior to the actual imposition of the defendant's sentence, and the burden imposed on the other person is to satisfy the court of the exception by a preponderance of the evidence.

The bill also addresses forfeiture of firearms other than in the context of a conviction under possession of a firearm by a prohibited person or in the context of a handgun used by the defendant or an accomplice during the commission of murder or any other unlawful homicide crime. The other person's burden is satisfied by proof by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the commission of the crime, the other person had a right to possess the firearm to the exclusion of the defendant. This burden is the same as under Title 17-A, section 1158.