| 6. The definition of willfulness in Comment 2 to Section 508 |
| has been followed by most courts. See, e.g., State v. Hodge, 460 |
| P.2d 596, 604 (Kan. 1969) ("No specific intent is necessary to |
| constitute the offense where one violates the securities act |
| except the intent to do the act denounced by the statute"); State |
| v. Nagel, 279 N.W.2d 911, 915 (S.D. 1979) ("[I]t is widely |
| understood that the legislature may forbid the doing of an act |
| and make its commission a crime without regard to the intent or |
| knowledge of the doer"); State v. Fries, 337 N.W.2d 398, 405 |
| (Neb. 1983) (proof of a specific intent, evil motive, or |
| knowledge that the law was being violated is not required to |
| sustain a criminal conviction under a state's blue sky law); |
| People v. Riley, 708 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Colo. 1985) ("A person acts |
| 'knowingly' or 'willfully' with respect to conduct . . . when he |
| is aware that his conduct . . . exists"); State v. Larsen, 865 |
| P.2d 1355, 1358 (Utah 1993) (willful implies a willingness to |
| commit the act, not an intent to violate the law or to injure |
| another or acquire any advantage); State v . Montgomery, 17 P.3d |
| 292, 294 (Idaho 2001) (bad faith is not required for a violation |
| of a state securities act; willful implies "simply a purpose or |
| willingness to commit the act or make the omission referred to"); |
| State v. Dumke, 901 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (mens rea |
| not required); State v. Mueller, 549 N.W.2d 455, 460 (Wis. Ct. |
| App. 1996) (willfulness does not require proof that the defendant |
| acted with intent to defraud or knowledge that the law was |
| violated); United States v. Lilley, 291 F. Supp. 989, 993 (S.D. |
| Tex. 1968) ("no knowledge" clause in federal statute not |
| available to defendant claiming lack of knowledge of particular |
| SEC rule). |
