| In 2001 a significant, albeit subtle amendment was made to |
| Subsection (a)(1). The intent was not to make a substantive |
| change, but rather to clarify the original intent of the |
| Drafting Committee. First, the time to measure whether the |
| issuing tribunal has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to |
| modify its order, or whether all parties and child have left |
| the State, is explicitly stated to be at the time of filing a |
| proceeding to modify the child support order. Second, |
| substitution of the term "is the residence" for the term |
| "remains the residence" makes clear that any interruption of |
| residence of a party between the date of the issuance of the |
| order and the date of filing the request for modification does |
| not affect jurisdiction to modify. Thus, if there is but one |
| order, it is the controlling order in effect and enforceable |
| throughout the United States, notwithstanding the fact that |
| everyone has left the issuing State. If the order is not |
| modified during this time of absence, a return to reside in |
| the issuing State by a party or child will immediately |
| identify the proper forum at the time of filing a proceeding |
| for modification. Although the statute does not speak |
| explicitly to the issue, temporary absence should be treated |
| in a similar fashion. Temporary employment in another State |
| may not forfeit a claim of residence in the issuing State, |
| State ex rel. Havlin v. Jamison, 971 S.W.2d 938 (Mo. App. |
| 1998). Of course, residence is a fact question for the trial |
| court, keeping in mind that the question is residence, not |
| domicile. |