LD 986
pg. 24
Page 23 of 77 An Act To Enact the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act Amendments of 1996 an... Page 25 of 77
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LR 467
Item 1

 
agree to the contrary, the issuing tribunal has continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction over its child-support order--which in
practical terms means that it may modify its order. The statute
attempts to be even-handed. The identity of the remaining party-
-obligor or obligee--does not matter. If the individual parties
have left the issuing State but the child remains behind,
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction [a.k.a. CEJ ] remains with
the issuing State. Even if all parties and the child no longer
reside in the State, the support order continues in existence
and is fully enforceable unless and until a modification takes
place in accordance with the requirements of Article 6, infra.
Note, however, that the CEJ of the issuing State over a spousal
support order is permanent, see Section 211, infra.

 
In 2001 a significant, albeit subtle amendment was made to
Subsection (a)(1). The intent was not to make a substantive
change, but rather to clarify the original intent of the
Drafting Committee. First, the time to measure whether the
issuing tribunal has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to
modify its order, or whether all parties and child have left
the State, is explicitly stated to be at the time of filing a
proceeding to modify the child support order. Second,
substitution of the term "is the residence" for the term
"remains the residence" makes clear that any interruption of
residence of a party between the date of the issuance of the
order and the date of filing the request for modification does
not affect jurisdiction to modify. Thus, if there is but one
order, it is the controlling order in effect and enforceable
throughout the United States, notwithstanding the fact that
everyone has left the issuing State. If the order is not
modified during this time of absence, a return to reside in
the issuing State by a party or child will immediately
identify the proper forum at the time of filing a proceeding
for modification. Although the statute does not speak
explicitly to the issue, temporary absence should be treated
in a similar fashion. Temporary employment in another State
may not forfeit a claim of residence in the issuing State,
State ex rel. Havlin v. Jamison, 971 S.W.2d 938 (Mo. App.
1998). Of course, residence is a fact question for the trial
court, keeping in mind that the question is residence, not
domicile.

 
A substantive change is made by the 2001 amendment that adds
entirely new language to Subsection (a)(2). From the beginning
of the implementation of the CEJ principle, questions have
been raised about why a tribunal may not modify its own order
if the parties agree that it should do so even after both
parties have left the State. The move of the parties and the
child from the State may have been of a very short distance
and, although the
parties reside outside the issuing State, they may prefer to
continue to be governed by the same issuing tribunal because
they continue to have a strong affiliation with the issuing
tribunal.


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