| The other side of the coin follows logically. Just as |
| Subsection (a) defines the retention of continuing, exclusive |
| jurisdiction, by clear implication the subsection also |
| identifies how jurisdiction to modify may be lost. That is, if |
| all the relevant persons--the obligor, the individual obligee, |
| and the child--have permanently left the issuing State, the |
| issuing State no longer has an appropriate nexus with the |
| parties or child to justify the exercise of jurisdiction to |
| modify its child-support order. See In re Marriage of |
| Erickson, Wash. App. Div. 3 2000, 991 P.2d 123, 98 (Wash. App. |
| 2000); Groseth v. Groseth, 600 N.W.2d 159 (Neb. 1999). |
| Further, the issuing tribunal has no current information about |
| the factual circumstances of anyone involved, and the |
| taxpayers of that State have no reason to expend public funds |
| on the process. Note, however, that the original order of the |
| issuing tribunal remains valid and enforceable. That order is |
| in effect not only in the issuing State but also in those |
| States in which the order has been registered. It also may be |
| registered and enforced in additional States even after the |
| issuing State has lost its power to modify its order, see |
| Sections 601-604, infra. The original order remains in effect |
| until it is properly modified in accordance with the narrow |
| terms of Sections 609-612, infra. |