| 3. The second major impediment to inclusion of an opt-in |
| provision for judicial review in the RUAA (and contractual |
| provisions to the same effect) is the contention that the |
| parties cannot contractually "create" subject matter |
| jurisdiction in the courts when it does not otherwise exist. |
| The "creation" of jurisdiction transpires because a statutory |
| provision that authorizes the parties to contractually create |
| or expand the jurisdiction of the state or federal courts can |
| result in courts being obliged to vacate arbitration awards on |
| grounds they otherwise would be foreclosed from relying upon. |
| Court cases under the federal law show the uncertainty of an |
| opt-in approach. See, e.g., Chicago Typographical Union v. |
| Chicago Sun-Times, 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991) ("If |
| the parties want, they can contract for an appellate |
| arbitration panel to review the arbitrator's award. But they |
| cannot contract for judicial review of that award; federal |
| [court] jurisdiction cannot be created by contract.") (labor |
| arbitration case); but see Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI |
| Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995) |
| (The court, relying on the Supreme Court's contractual view of |
| the commercial arbitration process reflected in Volt, |
| Mastrobuono, and First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. |
| 938, 947 (1995), the court held valid a contractual provision |
| providing for judicial review of arbitral errors of law. The |
| court concluded that the vacatur standards set out in |
| Section10(a) of the FAA provide only the default option in |
| circumstances where the parties fail to contractually |
| stipulate some alternate criteria for vacatur). |