| The continuing uncertainty as to the legal propriety and |
| enforceability of contractual opt-in provisions for judicial |
| review is best demonstrated by the opinion of the Ninth |
| Circuit Court of Appeals in LaPine Technology Corp. v. |
| Kyocera, 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997). The majority opinion in |
| Kyocera framed the issue before the court to be: "Is federal |
| court review of an arbitration agreement necessarily limited |
| to the grounds set forth in the FAA or can the court apply |
| greater scrutiny, if the parties have so agreed?" The court |
| held that it was obliged to honor the parties' agreement that |
| the arbitrator's award would be subject to judicial review for |
| errors of fact or law. It based that holding on the |
| contractual view of arbitration articulated in Volt and Prima |
| Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. |
| 395, 404 n.12 (1967) and their progeny. In doing so it |
| observed that body of case law "makes it clear that the |
| primary purpose of the FAA is to ensure enforcement of private |
| agreements to arbitrate, in accordance with the agreement's |
| terms." The Ninth Circuit relied squarely on the opinion of |
| the Fifth Circuit in Gateway. The court rejected the |
| "jurisdictional" view of the FAA set out by the Seventh |
| Circuit in Chicago Typographical Union. |